Last week the Deepwater Horizon, a Transocean Ltd. (NYSE: RIG) oil rig leased to British Petroleum (NYSE: BP), exploded and sank in the Gulf of Mexico, costing at least eleven lives, hundreds of millions of dollars in damages and great harm to the environment as its well leaks oil at a rapid rate. As I write this entry, the well is leaking 5,000 barrels (155,000 pounds) of oil per day into the Gulf. Even more frightening is the fact that if the well cannot be closed, the total leakage could amount to over 100,000 barrels (4.2 million pounds) of oil.
Many Americans are wondering why more safety precautions were not taken in anticipation of such an event, given the potentially catastrophic damage we are seeing now. Every oil well has a shut off valve, known as a blowout preventer, which cuts the flow of oil from a well when closed. Crew members of the rig were either unable to close the valve, or they tried and the shut-off process simply did not work. Still, the shut-off process should have happened automatically through the “dead man” switch, whose purpose is to sense catastrophe and close the valve. The Deepwater Horizon did have a dead man switch, but for unknown reasons it failed to close the valve. The last line of defense in this situation would be an acoustic trigger, a device that sends acoustic impulses through the water that can trigger a valve to shut down the well; however the Deepwater Horizon did not have one. Interestingly enough, BP was the main opponent of regulations proposed by the US that would have required acoustic triggers on deep sea rigs, citing unproven effectiveness and cost issues as their reasons for opposition. If it fails it fails, but it looks like it would have been worth the $500,000 (the cost of an acoustic trigger) to try – this incident alone is costing BP $6 million a day, not to mention the $560 million cost of replacing the rig.
The issue now is trying to stop the leak at its source, and then deciding how to move forward if that effort fails, which is very possible. Remote-controlled robots were dispatched to activate the blowout preventer, but so far those efforts have not proven effective. On Wednesday, BP conducted a “test burn” to measure the effectiveness of setting fire to the oil-filled water. While the test was successful, weather conditions deteriorated soon after, preventing any further burning from taking place. Other ideas for containing the leak include building a massive dome to be placed over the well, as well as drilling a second well at an angle to relieve the pressure of the leaking well, and intercept its contents. BP’s stock price has already fallen 13.8% since April 20th, the day of the explosion. But even more damaging to BP is that it is on the hook for the total cost of containment and cleanup, which is an unknown at this point but exceed $1 billion. Luckily for Transocean, it is insured for the total cost of the rig, $560 million, as well as $950 million in third-party liability coverage, but is responsible for any losses exceeding that figure.
It’s safe to say that we will see major changes in safety regulations for deep sea oil rigs, and eventually BP will be faced with fines and lawsuits related to the incident, but at this point the main concern is containing this massive leak and minimizing further damage. It also remains to be seen whether or not the government will scale back offshore drilling in general, mainly in the Gulf and off of the Atlantic.
Friday, April 30, 2010
Friday, April 23, 2010
Financial Reform Bill
All the focus this week is on two issues surrounding the financial industry – Obama’s efforts to push his financial regulatory reform bill through Congress, and the fraud lawsuit brought against Goldman Sachs by the SEC. While these two issues should be unrelated, it’s hard to overlook the convenient timing of the SEC’s accusation against Goldman. But since our President has assured us that he found out about the accusations from the news media, and that the SEC is an independent agency that does not report to the White House (and we know politicians always tell the whole truth), we can chalk it up to “coincidence.” And since I already discussed at length the charges being brought against Goldman and the likely effect on the company and stock market, I will spend more time focusing on the impending financial reform bill.
The financial regulatory debate has parallels with the recent healthcare issue. While most people understand why Washington is trying to implement these reforms, much like the healthcare reform bill, few people understand what reforms they are advocating, and how these reforms will affect Wall Street or anyone else. Additionally, both parties are taking such a strong stance on this issue that the facts have become secondary to partisan jabbing, leaving the American people clueless.
The goal of all the proposed reforms fall under four major categories: protecting individuals from banks and other large financial institutions, protecting these institutions from themselves, increasing the power of shareholders, and requiring more disclosure by financial institutions. The strongest opposition from Wall Street has been in response to the idea of a tax that would affect bank, thrift and insurance companies with more than $50 billion in assets, in order for the government to recoup its losses from the bailout. While this would generate more cash flow for the government, it would almost certainly lead to increased fees for these institutions’ clients. The law also seeks to heavily regulate the trading of derivatives, financial instruments whose value is dependent upon the price of an underlying asset. But too much regulation of derivatives could impede the ability of financial institutions and others to hedge against major losses (the intended purpose of derivatives trading). Other proposals include increased shareholder powers, a consumer protection agency, and the Volcker Rule which would require banks to be separate entities from hedge funds or private equity funds, and would also ban proprietary trading by banks except in certain cases.
Any future changes to our country’s financial industry will undoubtedly come with one major caveat – people will find a way around them. Congress needs to limit changes to things that have a high likelihood of achieving the above four goals without unpleasant side effects. Delaying full commissions for mortgage brokers until the loans have been refinanced or shown to be performing, and requiring banks to retain a stake in loans they securitize so that they remain on the hook for some of the losses, are both ideas that would provide positive incentives to do good while increasing accountability by financial institutions. These are the types of changes that might actually prevent another financial crisis. We could do without regulations that just create loopholes, encourage gaming the system and cause more distress to the American taxpayer.
The financial regulatory debate has parallels with the recent healthcare issue. While most people understand why Washington is trying to implement these reforms, much like the healthcare reform bill, few people understand what reforms they are advocating, and how these reforms will affect Wall Street or anyone else. Additionally, both parties are taking such a strong stance on this issue that the facts have become secondary to partisan jabbing, leaving the American people clueless.
The goal of all the proposed reforms fall under four major categories: protecting individuals from banks and other large financial institutions, protecting these institutions from themselves, increasing the power of shareholders, and requiring more disclosure by financial institutions. The strongest opposition from Wall Street has been in response to the idea of a tax that would affect bank, thrift and insurance companies with more than $50 billion in assets, in order for the government to recoup its losses from the bailout. While this would generate more cash flow for the government, it would almost certainly lead to increased fees for these institutions’ clients. The law also seeks to heavily regulate the trading of derivatives, financial instruments whose value is dependent upon the price of an underlying asset. But too much regulation of derivatives could impede the ability of financial institutions and others to hedge against major losses (the intended purpose of derivatives trading). Other proposals include increased shareholder powers, a consumer protection agency, and the Volcker Rule which would require banks to be separate entities from hedge funds or private equity funds, and would also ban proprietary trading by banks except in certain cases.
Any future changes to our country’s financial industry will undoubtedly come with one major caveat – people will find a way around them. Congress needs to limit changes to things that have a high likelihood of achieving the above four goals without unpleasant side effects. Delaying full commissions for mortgage brokers until the loans have been refinanced or shown to be performing, and requiring banks to retain a stake in loans they securitize so that they remain on the hook for some of the losses, are both ideas that would provide positive incentives to do good while increasing accountability by financial institutions. These are the types of changes that might actually prevent another financial crisis. We could do without regulations that just create loopholes, encourage gaming the system and cause more distress to the American taxpayer.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
Government Bond Yields Reflect More Than Just Default Risk
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again – we (investors and non-investors alike) need something to worry about. So it shouldn’t come as too much of a surprise that members of the media are questioning the safety of US debt after three Treasury auctions were met with poor demand a couple of weeks ago, mainly from foreign investors. There are a lot of things we should worry about as investors, but the safety of US Treasury debt is not one of them. In the Wall Street Journal article entitled “Debt Fears Send Rates Up,” the reporter points out that during the prior week, U.S. Treasuries were yielding slightly more than U.S. corporate bonds, which is surprising but not unheard of. But her source, an economist at BNP Paribas, brazenly goes on to say that maybe investors are more comfortable with the risks of owning bonds backed by U.S. corporations than the government. This seems far-fetched considering our government just bailed out a number of our country’s most prominent banks and automakers to the tune of nearly a trillion dollars, and given the fact that the US has never even come close to defaulting on our debt. While it is a worst-case scenario, we could simply print more money, unlike many European governments—such as Greece—which depend on the European Central Bank to control the money supply in the Eurozone.
A rising yield for Treasuries, or any developed country’s debt issues, is only occasionally reflective of increased default risk, which is not the main determinant of bond yields and prices. Expected growth, inflation and changes in currency exchange rates are the major determinants of government bond prices; in many cases, they are more important than default risk in pricing a bond. Let’s look at current bond yields to illustrate this point. 10-year U.S. Treasuries and U.K. Gilts currently yield 3.63% and 3.75% respectively, while Japanese government bonds yield only 1.40%. However, according to the S&P, Japan’s credit rating is “AA” while the U.S. and U.K. both have the most secure rating of “AAA.” Whether this is caused by expected appreciation of the Yen against other currencies or assumptions about growth rates or inflation in Japan, it is clear that investors are willing to take a much lower interest rate on Japanese bonds despite their supposed higher default risk.
The decrease in Treasury prices and subsequent increase in yields (since prices and yields move inversely to one another) isn’t something to completely overlook. This could be problematic for the housing market, as it could lead to increased mortgage rates, or could be indicative of other impending problems for the U.S, such as higher inflation down the road. But it certainly does not mean U.S. debt is any less secure than it always has been for many decades.
A rising yield for Treasuries, or any developed country’s debt issues, is only occasionally reflective of increased default risk, which is not the main determinant of bond yields and prices. Expected growth, inflation and changes in currency exchange rates are the major determinants of government bond prices; in many cases, they are more important than default risk in pricing a bond. Let’s look at current bond yields to illustrate this point. 10-year U.S. Treasuries and U.K. Gilts currently yield 3.63% and 3.75% respectively, while Japanese government bonds yield only 1.40%. However, according to the S&P, Japan’s credit rating is “AA” while the U.S. and U.K. both have the most secure rating of “AAA.” Whether this is caused by expected appreciation of the Yen against other currencies or assumptions about growth rates or inflation in Japan, it is clear that investors are willing to take a much lower interest rate on Japanese bonds despite their supposed higher default risk.
The decrease in Treasury prices and subsequent increase in yields (since prices and yields move inversely to one another) isn’t something to completely overlook. This could be problematic for the housing market, as it could lead to increased mortgage rates, or could be indicative of other impending problems for the U.S, such as higher inflation down the road. But it certainly does not mean U.S. debt is any less secure than it always has been for many decades.
Friday, March 12, 2010
Gambling, Losing, and Complaining About It
There has been a recent uproar from citizens and politicians, in Los Angeles and a number of other cities and counties in the U.S., over municipal interest rate swaps that are now costing local governments millions of dollars a year. An interest rate swap is essentially a legal bet between two entities, one of which is trying to hedge its interest rate exposure. In Los Angeles’ case, the swap was made with Bank of New York (BNY) Mellon, who in 2006 exchanged $443 million worth of fixed-rate debt for an equivalent amount of variable-rate debt issued by the city.
Los Angeles made the deal to protect itself against the possibility of rising interest rates, which would have increased the interest owed on its variable-rate municipal bonds. However, in agreeing to this exchange, the city exposed itself to the risk that interest rates would fall, which they of course did—dramatically. The payoff in a swap is determined each quarter by the spread (difference) between the variable and fixed rate. Thus, the fixed-rate buyer stands to gain if interest rates rise, or lose if they fall.
Four years and one economic crisis later, the City of Los Angeles finds itself on the hook for $19 million a year (at today’s interest rates). But rather than accept the consequences of its gamble, or opt to refinance the floating rate debt with fixed-rate bonds, the city is demanding a renegotiation of the deal and threatening to never do business with BNY again if it does not comply. The most vocal cry baby of this effort is city councilman Richard Alarcon, who according to the LA Times described the deals as “tantamount to gouging” and likened the bank to merchants who sold water for $20 per gallon after the 1994 Northridge earthquake.
Conveniently, Mr. Alarcon doesn’t bother to mention that the City of LA, arguably a sophisticated investor, agreed to the deal, in which BNY also assumed risk. This is very different from the price-gouging merchants, who were taking advantage of increased demand owing to a natural disaster. “The bank is taking an unconscionable profit,” said Alarcon according to the Wall Street Journal. “We want to bring it down to a simple customer-to-vendor relationship. When a customer is not satisfied, they go to a different vendor.”
Yes, Mr. Alarcon, LA is welcome to use a different swap vendor in the future, but the city still owes the money on the legal contract signed by consenting adults. We feel that there is even less substance to these claims than to those of a gambler who asks for his losses back from the casino.
Taxpayers in LA and other municipalities where interest-rate swaps have gone awry (such as Jefferson County, AL which owes $3.2 billion on sewer bonds) are probably all wondering the same thing: Why gamble? Swaps are typically used as a hedging instrument. For example, if you have exposed yourself to the risk of rising interest rates from issuing floating-rate bonds, you can mitigate that risk (and any reward if interest rates drop) with a swap. So the city either made a cold bet on the future of interest rates, or it has succeeded in hedging another risk and still wants to recoup its losses on these swaps. What we are seeing here is nothing more than a case of buyer’s remorse at the municipal level.
Los Angeles made the deal to protect itself against the possibility of rising interest rates, which would have increased the interest owed on its variable-rate municipal bonds. However, in agreeing to this exchange, the city exposed itself to the risk that interest rates would fall, which they of course did—dramatically. The payoff in a swap is determined each quarter by the spread (difference) between the variable and fixed rate. Thus, the fixed-rate buyer stands to gain if interest rates rise, or lose if they fall.
Four years and one economic crisis later, the City of Los Angeles finds itself on the hook for $19 million a year (at today’s interest rates). But rather than accept the consequences of its gamble, or opt to refinance the floating rate debt with fixed-rate bonds, the city is demanding a renegotiation of the deal and threatening to never do business with BNY again if it does not comply. The most vocal cry baby of this effort is city councilman Richard Alarcon, who according to the LA Times described the deals as “tantamount to gouging” and likened the bank to merchants who sold water for $20 per gallon after the 1994 Northridge earthquake.
Conveniently, Mr. Alarcon doesn’t bother to mention that the City of LA, arguably a sophisticated investor, agreed to the deal, in which BNY also assumed risk. This is very different from the price-gouging merchants, who were taking advantage of increased demand owing to a natural disaster. “The bank is taking an unconscionable profit,” said Alarcon according to the Wall Street Journal. “We want to bring it down to a simple customer-to-vendor relationship. When a customer is not satisfied, they go to a different vendor.”
Yes, Mr. Alarcon, LA is welcome to use a different swap vendor in the future, but the city still owes the money on the legal contract signed by consenting adults. We feel that there is even less substance to these claims than to those of a gambler who asks for his losses back from the casino.
Taxpayers in LA and other municipalities where interest-rate swaps have gone awry (such as Jefferson County, AL which owes $3.2 billion on sewer bonds) are probably all wondering the same thing: Why gamble? Swaps are typically used as a hedging instrument. For example, if you have exposed yourself to the risk of rising interest rates from issuing floating-rate bonds, you can mitigate that risk (and any reward if interest rates drop) with a swap. So the city either made a cold bet on the future of interest rates, or it has succeeded in hedging another risk and still wants to recoup its losses on these swaps. What we are seeing here is nothing more than a case of buyer’s remorse at the municipal level.
Friday, March 5, 2010
Currencies and Purchasing Power
This week we are looking at the fluctuation of currency exchange rates, as well as the effects of exchange rates on investors and consumers. The exchange rate between two currencies indicates the relative worth of one currency against the other. As I write this article, the Euro-to-US dollar (EUR/USD) exchange rate is 1.36 – one Euro has the equivalent value to $1.36 USD. The American dollar-to-British Pound (USD/GBP) exchange rate is 0.66, so an American dollar in England can purchase £0.66 worth of goods. In efficient markets, equivalent items should cost the same in all countries; this is known as “the law of one price.” But since prices cannot adjust to rapidly fluctuating exchange rates, the purchasing power of one currency against another is constantly changing.
Purchasing power parity (PPP), based on the law of one price, attempts to find the appropriate exchange rate so that an identical good in two different countries has the same price in terms of purchasing power. In theory, PPP should determine exchange rates; in the real world, currencies fluctuate for all sorts of other reasons, while the prices of goods and services remain constant over short periods of time. (A notable exception is The Trader Bar in Melbourne, Australia, where the price of each drink fluctuates based on the current demand. A lighthearted, though effective, illustration of PPP is The Economist’s Big Mac Index, which compares the price of a McDonald’s Big Mac in different countries against the country’s exchange rate to show how relatively expensive or cheap each currency is.
The market exchange rate determines the purchasing power of one currency relative to another, but what determines market exchange rates? Let’s look at the recent situation in Europe and how it has affected the purchasing power of the Euro. Currencies fluctuate similarly to bonds in that a rise in interest rates results in a decrease in the currency value, which happened recently as a Greece, Spain and other European nations issued a large amount of debt. Uncertainty over these governments’ ability to repay loans to their investors forced them to issue debt at a higher interest rate than previously; as expected, the Euro declined sharply. For example, relative to the US dollar, Australian dollar and Yen, the Euro has fallen -4.90%, -5.63% and -7.66% respectively since January 1, 2010. These are drastic declines over such a short period.
Investing in the foreign exchange market is unique in that it operates 24/7 and produces small profit margins in comparison to other markets. As a rule, I do not attempt to use currencies as long-term investments. I do, however, occasionally hedge against large fluctuations in exchange rates that may affect my foreign investments by using various techniques. Currency fluctuations don’t usually affect investment returns that much over the long term, but exchange rates can be highly volatile over short periods of time.
In the long run, purchasing power parity should determine the relative value of currencies. But in the short term, currencies can be substantially over or undervalued, such as the Yuan which the Big Mac Index estimated to be almost 50% cheaper than the US dollar. So if you are looking for the best price on Big Mac’s, look no further than Beijing!
Purchasing power parity (PPP), based on the law of one price, attempts to find the appropriate exchange rate so that an identical good in two different countries has the same price in terms of purchasing power. In theory, PPP should determine exchange rates; in the real world, currencies fluctuate for all sorts of other reasons, while the prices of goods and services remain constant over short periods of time. (A notable exception is The Trader Bar in Melbourne, Australia, where the price of each drink fluctuates based on the current demand. A lighthearted, though effective, illustration of PPP is The Economist’s Big Mac Index, which compares the price of a McDonald’s Big Mac in different countries against the country’s exchange rate to show how relatively expensive or cheap each currency is.
The market exchange rate determines the purchasing power of one currency relative to another, but what determines market exchange rates? Let’s look at the recent situation in Europe and how it has affected the purchasing power of the Euro. Currencies fluctuate similarly to bonds in that a rise in interest rates results in a decrease in the currency value, which happened recently as a Greece, Spain and other European nations issued a large amount of debt. Uncertainty over these governments’ ability to repay loans to their investors forced them to issue debt at a higher interest rate than previously; as expected, the Euro declined sharply. For example, relative to the US dollar, Australian dollar and Yen, the Euro has fallen -4.90%, -5.63% and -7.66% respectively since January 1, 2010. These are drastic declines over such a short period.
Investing in the foreign exchange market is unique in that it operates 24/7 and produces small profit margins in comparison to other markets. As a rule, I do not attempt to use currencies as long-term investments. I do, however, occasionally hedge against large fluctuations in exchange rates that may affect my foreign investments by using various techniques. Currency fluctuations don’t usually affect investment returns that much over the long term, but exchange rates can be highly volatile over short periods of time.
In the long run, purchasing power parity should determine the relative value of currencies. But in the short term, currencies can be substantially over or undervalued, such as the Yuan which the Big Mac Index estimated to be almost 50% cheaper than the US dollar. So if you are looking for the best price on Big Mac’s, look no further than Beijing!
Friday, February 26, 2010
GDP: Fourth Quarter 2009
This morning the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its second estimate for 2009 4th quarter gross domestic product (GDP), which they estimated at just under $14.5 trillion. GDP measures the output of domestically-produced goods and services. The real (inflation-adjusted) GDP increased at an annualized +5.9% from the third quarter, a jump from the previous quarter’s +2.2% increase. And while annual GDP decreased -2.4% from 2008 to 2009, last quarter’s GDP was +0.1% higher than the 4th quarter of 2008. The current report indicates positive shifts in a number of important areas, and is consistent with a country beginning to claw its way out of recession.
GDP is divided into four broad categories: personal consumption, private investment, government spending and net exports (the difference between exports and imports). The largest increase from the prior quarter came from private investment, which increased an astounding +48.9%, thanks in part to improvement in private inventories (after a -23.1% decrease over all of 2009). The change in private inventories accounted for 64% of the total change in real GDP. Both this change and the +2.8% increase in consumption of goods reflect the improved consumer spending as well as anticipated spending. They also demonstrate what I discussed yesterday in my email article – that both recessions and recoveries are driven by business spending, not consumers. Consumers buy after Corporate America: if Wal-Mart is re-stocking their inventory, they do so because they are expecting us to buy more of their products.
As for government expenditures, which include federal and state/local spending, you may be surprised to learn that they decreased by -1.2% from the prior quarter. State and local governments decreased spending by -2.0% while the federal government increased spending by +0.1%. Federal government spending is broken down into defense and non-defense spending, which dropped -3.5% and increased +8.3%, respectively. The fact that a small decrease in defense spending and a large increase in non-defense spending effectively negate one another shows how much of our discretionary spending (64%) is devoted to national security.
Another favorable economic indicator from the recent GDP estimates is the increase in both exports and imports. While we are still running a trade deficit of -$347 billion, we can take some solace in the fact that exports increased +22.4% from the previous quarter while imports rose +15.3% over the same time period. This capped off a 2009 that saw a +$138.9 billion increase in net exports (a decrease in the trade deficit) from the previous year and a fourth quarter increase of +$10.3 billion. Historically, a substantial increase in both imports and exports is a strong indicator of economic recovery.
While it is promising to finally see significant growth in consumer spending, private investment, exports and other important areas, it only means things are headed in the right direction. Last year’s real GDP is still a -2.4% decrease from 2008. We are definitely on the road to recovery, but we still have a ways to travel to get there.
GDP is divided into four broad categories: personal consumption, private investment, government spending and net exports (the difference between exports and imports). The largest increase from the prior quarter came from private investment, which increased an astounding +48.9%, thanks in part to improvement in private inventories (after a -23.1% decrease over all of 2009). The change in private inventories accounted for 64% of the total change in real GDP. Both this change and the +2.8% increase in consumption of goods reflect the improved consumer spending as well as anticipated spending. They also demonstrate what I discussed yesterday in my email article – that both recessions and recoveries are driven by business spending, not consumers. Consumers buy after Corporate America: if Wal-Mart is re-stocking their inventory, they do so because they are expecting us to buy more of their products.
As for government expenditures, which include federal and state/local spending, you may be surprised to learn that they decreased by -1.2% from the prior quarter. State and local governments decreased spending by -2.0% while the federal government increased spending by +0.1%. Federal government spending is broken down into defense and non-defense spending, which dropped -3.5% and increased +8.3%, respectively. The fact that a small decrease in defense spending and a large increase in non-defense spending effectively negate one another shows how much of our discretionary spending (64%) is devoted to national security.
Another favorable economic indicator from the recent GDP estimates is the increase in both exports and imports. While we are still running a trade deficit of -$347 billion, we can take some solace in the fact that exports increased +22.4% from the previous quarter while imports rose +15.3% over the same time period. This capped off a 2009 that saw a +$138.9 billion increase in net exports (a decrease in the trade deficit) from the previous year and a fourth quarter increase of +$10.3 billion. Historically, a substantial increase in both imports and exports is a strong indicator of economic recovery.
While it is promising to finally see significant growth in consumer spending, private investment, exports and other important areas, it only means things are headed in the right direction. Last year’s real GDP is still a -2.4% decrease from 2008. We are definitely on the road to recovery, but we still have a ways to travel to get there.
Friday, February 19, 2010
Treasuries
Last week we looked at historical returns on gold and showed that, despite widely-held beliefs about the commodity, it’s a risky investment that barely keeps up with inflation. We showed that over time, gold has proven itself to be significantly riskier and far less profitable than stocks.
This week we look at treasuries, which by their nature are not as risky as stocks or commodities, but are still perceived to be far safer than they truly are when you look at real (inflation-adjusted) return. Treasuries are unique in being fully guaranteed by the US government. If you buy a $1,000 10-year treasury bond with a 6.8% coupon, you will undoubtedly receive $34 semi-annually until the bond matures, at which point you get your $1,000 back. The total interest earned over this period (before reinvestment) is $680. But even with the ultra-safe, guaranteed return, you could still lose money!
You may be wondering how it’s possible for an investment with guaranteed returns to lose value. The answer is inflation. For example, $1,000 in 1970 had spending power equivalent to over $2,160 in 1980. If you collected any less than $1,160 in interest payments over the life of the bond, your real (inflation-adjusted) return was negative. In the example above, you would actually have lost $480 over the 10-year period.
Let’s compare treasury bills, which mature in one year or less, treasury bonds, which mature between 20 and 30 years, and common stocks. Since 1871, stocks have returned +6.3% annually after inflation, compared to +1.9% for treasury bills and +2.4% for treasury bonds. So stocks provided far better returns over the long term.
Now let’s look at risk. Over the past 110 years, the worst decades for stocks were the 2000s, when they returned –2.2% annually, and the 1910s (–2.1% annually). Treasury bills, on the other hand, returned –4.5% per year during the 1940s, while treasury bonds dropped –4.8% per year in the 1910s and –3.2% in the 1940s. Not so safe after all it seems.
So while treasuries fluctuate less than stocks in the short term, their worst-case performance over a decade is lower than for stocks. And stocks’ best-case performance is far better: +15.7% in the 1990s vs. +8.1 for treasury bonds and +3.7% for bills in the 1980s. So while bonds are an important part of a diversified portfolio, and usually yield a positive real return, it is important to understand that risk is inherent in any potentially profitable endeavor. US treasuries are no exception.
This week we look at treasuries, which by their nature are not as risky as stocks or commodities, but are still perceived to be far safer than they truly are when you look at real (inflation-adjusted) return. Treasuries are unique in being fully guaranteed by the US government. If you buy a $1,000 10-year treasury bond with a 6.8% coupon, you will undoubtedly receive $34 semi-annually until the bond matures, at which point you get your $1,000 back. The total interest earned over this period (before reinvestment) is $680. But even with the ultra-safe, guaranteed return, you could still lose money!
You may be wondering how it’s possible for an investment with guaranteed returns to lose value. The answer is inflation. For example, $1,000 in 1970 had spending power equivalent to over $2,160 in 1980. If you collected any less than $1,160 in interest payments over the life of the bond, your real (inflation-adjusted) return was negative. In the example above, you would actually have lost $480 over the 10-year period.
Let’s compare treasury bills, which mature in one year or less, treasury bonds, which mature between 20 and 30 years, and common stocks. Since 1871, stocks have returned +6.3% annually after inflation, compared to +1.9% for treasury bills and +2.4% for treasury bonds. So stocks provided far better returns over the long term.
Now let’s look at risk. Over the past 110 years, the worst decades for stocks were the 2000s, when they returned –2.2% annually, and the 1910s (–2.1% annually). Treasury bills, on the other hand, returned –4.5% per year during the 1940s, while treasury bonds dropped –4.8% per year in the 1910s and –3.2% in the 1940s. Not so safe after all it seems.
So while treasuries fluctuate less than stocks in the short term, their worst-case performance over a decade is lower than for stocks. And stocks’ best-case performance is far better: +15.7% in the 1990s vs. +8.1 for treasury bonds and +3.7% for bills in the 1980s. So while bonds are an important part of a diversified portfolio, and usually yield a positive real return, it is important to understand that risk is inherent in any potentially profitable endeavor. US treasuries are no exception.
Friday, February 12, 2010
Gold – Not So Safe after All
Following a disastrous 2008 for equities, stocks have come to be perceived as risky, volatile investments, especially for investors funding retirement accounts and other conservative portfolios. Instead of trying to find the next Google, investors have become more interested in finding safe places for their money – low-volatility, minimal-risk investments that hopefully protect against inflation. Gold has recently developed a reputation for being one of these “safe” investments after posting a comparatively fantastic +11.28% annualized return from 2000-2009, a decade during which stocks actually declined for the first time since the 1930s. Seems like gold is the place to be!
But wait one second. An historical analysis of gold returns against the S&P 500 shows that not only has gold been less profitable than stocks over the long-run – it has also been more volatile. You may be surprised to learn that gold has only outperformed stocks in three of the eleven decades since 1900, and has barely posted a positive return since 1871, with less than +0.8% annual growth, while stocks have grown +6.3% annually over the same period (both of these figures are after inflation). To get an idea of the significance of this difference, over 30 years at the above rates of return, $1,000 worth of gold would have grown to $1,266, vs. $6,252 for stocks (again, after inflation).
Until 1968, the price of gold fluctuated little owing to fixed prices and the Bretton Woods System, which held gold to a fixed price relative to the value of the US dollar, the system’s anchor currency. The system was enacted partly because the US government had nearly $26 billion in gold reserves, and by controlling the price of the commodity it virtually ensured the value of its gold would not substantially decrease. Bretton Woods eventually became unsustainable and was ended in 1968, at which point the price of gold was free to fluctuate. But in comparing returns on stocks and gold since the 1970s, a decade where gold returned an average of +16% annually after inflation, we still see a greater annualized return for stocks (+5.2%) than for gold (+4.2%) in the 40 years since 1970. The 80s and 90s saw a massive disparity between the two investments: stocks posted annualized after-inflation returns of +9.9% and +15.7% respectively over each of the two decades, while gold lost value at annualized rates of -8.2% and -5.3%. So much for hedging against inflation!
My point is not that one should only own stocks and never own gold. Nor do I necessarily disagree with analysts who project that gold will be a profitable investment over the near term. I am just using historical analysis to show that gold has been a relatively poor investment and ineffective inflation hedge over the long term, and is even more volatile and unpredictable than stocks. Its recent reputation as the perfect inflation hedge or as a “safe” investment is not deserved.
This is an illustration of how $100 would have grown over the last thirty years (click to enlarge):
But wait one second. An historical analysis of gold returns against the S&P 500 shows that not only has gold been less profitable than stocks over the long-run – it has also been more volatile. You may be surprised to learn that gold has only outperformed stocks in three of the eleven decades since 1900, and has barely posted a positive return since 1871, with less than +0.8% annual growth, while stocks have grown +6.3% annually over the same period (both of these figures are after inflation). To get an idea of the significance of this difference, over 30 years at the above rates of return, $1,000 worth of gold would have grown to $1,266, vs. $6,252 for stocks (again, after inflation).
Until 1968, the price of gold fluctuated little owing to fixed prices and the Bretton Woods System, which held gold to a fixed price relative to the value of the US dollar, the system’s anchor currency. The system was enacted partly because the US government had nearly $26 billion in gold reserves, and by controlling the price of the commodity it virtually ensured the value of its gold would not substantially decrease. Bretton Woods eventually became unsustainable and was ended in 1968, at which point the price of gold was free to fluctuate. But in comparing returns on stocks and gold since the 1970s, a decade where gold returned an average of +16% annually after inflation, we still see a greater annualized return for stocks (+5.2%) than for gold (+4.2%) in the 40 years since 1970. The 80s and 90s saw a massive disparity between the two investments: stocks posted annualized after-inflation returns of +9.9% and +15.7% respectively over each of the two decades, while gold lost value at annualized rates of -8.2% and -5.3%. So much for hedging against inflation!
My point is not that one should only own stocks and never own gold. Nor do I necessarily disagree with analysts who project that gold will be a profitable investment over the near term. I am just using historical analysis to show that gold has been a relatively poor investment and ineffective inflation hedge over the long term, and is even more volatile and unpredictable than stocks. Its recent reputation as the perfect inflation hedge or as a “safe” investment is not deserved.
This is an illustration of how $100 would have grown over the last thirty years (click to enlarge):
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
Looking for Bad News in Greece and China
There are times when investors want to find reasons to see the glass as half-empty—looking for some issue or problem to confirm our fears and justify scaling back our positions or becoming more conservative in our investing. Last week was one of those times. It should have been a good week for stocks, between Bernanke’s reconfirmation, better-than-expected corporate earnings and a +5.7% jump in GDP for the 4th quarter, the most in six years. Instead, we saw sharp declines in stocks around the world from Tuesday through Friday. The two most obvious scapegoats are Greece, with the possibility of its national government defaulting on its debts, and China, which intends to curtail its own economic growth over fears of future inflation.
Analysts and stock market reporters can write much better stories by looking at what happened (stocks fell) and trying to explain why it happened (people were scared about Greece and China) rather than addressing the real issue—investors are still scared of being burned, and are looking for every reason not to invest, even if they are not good reasons.
We haven’t seen a national government default since Argentina in 2002. Before that we saw Russia and Ecuador in 1998 and North Korea in 1987 (that last one must have been a real shocker!). And though there is a slim possibility that Greece could default on its debt, I find it hard to believe, especially in view of recent statements, that the other EU nations will let this happen and endanger their monetary union. It is hard to say what effect an EU bailout of Greece would have on the US stock market, but the distant possibility of a foreign default is not reason enough for investors to shy away from investing when conditions are otherwise as promising as they were last week.
With China, why is it such a big problem if the government there wants to ease growth from too fast to just fast enough? Might they overshoot and slow the economy more than they would like? Of course they could, but their recent actions to rein in lending were triggered by data showing that the Chinese economy has been growing much faster than expected. Even investors in “China-sensitive” stocks, such as energy and materials, must have been surprised by 2009’s upwardly revised GDP figure of +8.2%. China’s economic growth rate had actually been accelerating throughout last year. The rest of the world should be so lucky.
Make no mistake, I am not saying that the possibility of Greece defaulting or China’s future economic growth slowing a little too much should not be considered in our decisions today, because they could affect our global economy and equity markets. I just question the sudden and indiscriminate selling of securities amidst the reality of better than expected economic news and corporate earnings reports on the basis of “what-if” scenarios that probably won’t ever happen.
Analysts and stock market reporters can write much better stories by looking at what happened (stocks fell) and trying to explain why it happened (people were scared about Greece and China) rather than addressing the real issue—investors are still scared of being burned, and are looking for every reason not to invest, even if they are not good reasons.
We haven’t seen a national government default since Argentina in 2002. Before that we saw Russia and Ecuador in 1998 and North Korea in 1987 (that last one must have been a real shocker!). And though there is a slim possibility that Greece could default on its debt, I find it hard to believe, especially in view of recent statements, that the other EU nations will let this happen and endanger their monetary union. It is hard to say what effect an EU bailout of Greece would have on the US stock market, but the distant possibility of a foreign default is not reason enough for investors to shy away from investing when conditions are otherwise as promising as they were last week.
With China, why is it such a big problem if the government there wants to ease growth from too fast to just fast enough? Might they overshoot and slow the economy more than they would like? Of course they could, but their recent actions to rein in lending were triggered by data showing that the Chinese economy has been growing much faster than expected. Even investors in “China-sensitive” stocks, such as energy and materials, must have been surprised by 2009’s upwardly revised GDP figure of +8.2%. China’s economic growth rate had actually been accelerating throughout last year. The rest of the world should be so lucky.
Make no mistake, I am not saying that the possibility of Greece defaulting or China’s future economic growth slowing a little too much should not be considered in our decisions today, because they could affect our global economy and equity markets. I just question the sudden and indiscriminate selling of securities amidst the reality of better than expected economic news and corporate earnings reports on the basis of “what-if” scenarios that probably won’t ever happen.
Friday, January 22, 2010
No Healthcare Bill -- What Now?
Healthcare stocks rallied Tuesday morning when it was all but confirmed that Massachusetts Republican Scott Brown would be Ted Kennedy’s replacement in the Senate, likely dooming Obama’s healthcare initiative. Reports from Wall Street indicated a sense of relief among healthcare investors, in large part because we would not have to deal with the uncertainty of a restructured health insurance system. Famed stock trader Jesse Livermore said that “all through time, people have basically acted and reacted the same way in the market as a result of: greed, fear, ignorance, and hope.” Aside from investors’ aversion to change of any kind, the situation surrounding the healthcare bill can be attributed to two of these emotions – fear and ignorance.
How many people can say they understand the intricacies of Obama’s healthcare plan? Not very many – and even for those who do, there are too many factors to take into account to predict its long-term effect on the healthcare industry or the overall economy. Nonetheless, due to the uncertainty of the proposed plan, stocks of managed care companies and pharmaceutical firms performed poorly in 2009 relative to the market. But as it became less probable that we would see a dramatic restructuring of the healthcare system, these firms’ stocks started to rally strongly.
This is a clear example of how fear and ignorance drive investment decisions. We fear the proposed change, and we are too ignorant to embrace the possibility of the change producing a good outcome. Obviously there are political and selfish motivations for opposition to the plan, but for all we know Obamacare could be a good thing for the healthcare industry. (Medicare was fought bitterly in the 1960’s, yet it drove tremendous growth and innovation in healthcare.) For example, millions of uninsured Americans would become policyholders, potentially increasing the revenues of health insurers, along with doctors, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies. Or it could cause a nightmare for healthcare companies and their investors, as many believe. Nobody can know for certain, but one thing we do know is that we’re scared to death to find out.
In any case, the battle over Obamacare has certainly confirmed Jesse Livermore’s assertion – at least the part about fear and ignorance.
How many people can say they understand the intricacies of Obama’s healthcare plan? Not very many – and even for those who do, there are too many factors to take into account to predict its long-term effect on the healthcare industry or the overall economy. Nonetheless, due to the uncertainty of the proposed plan, stocks of managed care companies and pharmaceutical firms performed poorly in 2009 relative to the market. But as it became less probable that we would see a dramatic restructuring of the healthcare system, these firms’ stocks started to rally strongly.
This is a clear example of how fear and ignorance drive investment decisions. We fear the proposed change, and we are too ignorant to embrace the possibility of the change producing a good outcome. Obviously there are political and selfish motivations for opposition to the plan, but for all we know Obamacare could be a good thing for the healthcare industry. (Medicare was fought bitterly in the 1960’s, yet it drove tremendous growth and innovation in healthcare.) For example, millions of uninsured Americans would become policyholders, potentially increasing the revenues of health insurers, along with doctors, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies. Or it could cause a nightmare for healthcare companies and their investors, as many believe. Nobody can know for certain, but one thing we do know is that we’re scared to death to find out.
In any case, the battle over Obamacare has certainly confirmed Jesse Livermore’s assertion – at least the part about fear and ignorance.
Friday, January 15, 2010
Roth Conversion—Much Ado about Anything?
This year, everyone seems so excited about the new guidelines for converting your traditional IRA to a Roth IRA. For those of you living in a cave, the new rule that took effect at the beginning of the year allows anyone to convert a traditional IRA to a Roth. Before 2010, you could only convert if your modified adjusted gross income was less than $100,000/year. Also, a “one-time special offer” allows the tax burden from the conversion to be spread over the next two years. While the new guidelines provide a potentially money-saving opportunity for some people, it’s far from the “no-brainer” that many financial columnists would lead you to believe.
A traditional IRA is typically funded by pre-tax dollars, providing a tax write-off when you make the contribution, but the withdrawals are taxed as ordinary income. They also require investors to begin withdrawing money at age 70 ½ in the form of required minimum distributions (RMD). To make matters worse, your withdrawals could push you into a higher tax bracket and force you to pay more taxes than necessary. On the other hand, a Roth IRA taxes the funds contributed at the time of contribution, with the promise of tax-free withdrawals in the future and no distribution requirements. It sounds like a slam dunk to convert, but everyone’s situation is different, making the answer to the question fuzzy and in need of case-by-case analysis.
Lifting the income restrictions for Roth conversions, and incentivizing the move even more with drawn out taxation, certainly makes sense for the government. During the next two years, the Federal and state governments will realize tax dollars they would not have seen for years from people who take advantage of the new laws. If enough previously excluded investors decide to make the move, it could mean a big near-term payoff for government, especially since far more money is tied up in traditional IRAs than in Roths ($3.7 trillion vs. $178 billion in 2006).
For the individual investor who can comfortably afford the immediate tax burden of conversion, and who is confident that those tax dollars are unlikely to serve a better, more efficient purpose, making the conversion seems like the logical move. But consider the uncertainty of the world we live in, and the nature of financial markets. Also consider a scenario a decade or two down the road where the government, in a similar situation to today, needs to generate revenue. They might not find it hard to justify taking money from rich people who are withdrawing massive amounts of tax-free money from their retirement accounts. Although an unlikely scenario, it forces you to look at the big picture and ask, “Why pay tax now if I can delay it?” Perhaps, 401(k) expert David Loeper said it best in a recent article: “With a highly uncertain future, basic option theory and common sense dictates that we should not pay additional tax now with certainty if we can avoid it, unless there is a clearly compelling advantage to doing so.” Don’t just go blindly and convert; do a thorough analysis and convince yourself that it really makes sense.
For most people, the analysis is too tedious and convoluted to spend time on, and most of the online tools are far too simplistic. If you have a financial advisor that you trust, he or she should do the analysis for you. If you are seriously considering conversion but don’t have a trusted financial advisor, it may be worth the cost to hire one just for this purpose. The fee may justify the wisdom of conversion, or it may save you from paying a lot of income tax today unnecessarily.
A traditional IRA is typically funded by pre-tax dollars, providing a tax write-off when you make the contribution, but the withdrawals are taxed as ordinary income. They also require investors to begin withdrawing money at age 70 ½ in the form of required minimum distributions (RMD). To make matters worse, your withdrawals could push you into a higher tax bracket and force you to pay more taxes than necessary. On the other hand, a Roth IRA taxes the funds contributed at the time of contribution, with the promise of tax-free withdrawals in the future and no distribution requirements. It sounds like a slam dunk to convert, but everyone’s situation is different, making the answer to the question fuzzy and in need of case-by-case analysis.
Lifting the income restrictions for Roth conversions, and incentivizing the move even more with drawn out taxation, certainly makes sense for the government. During the next two years, the Federal and state governments will realize tax dollars they would not have seen for years from people who take advantage of the new laws. If enough previously excluded investors decide to make the move, it could mean a big near-term payoff for government, especially since far more money is tied up in traditional IRAs than in Roths ($3.7 trillion vs. $178 billion in 2006).
For the individual investor who can comfortably afford the immediate tax burden of conversion, and who is confident that those tax dollars are unlikely to serve a better, more efficient purpose, making the conversion seems like the logical move. But consider the uncertainty of the world we live in, and the nature of financial markets. Also consider a scenario a decade or two down the road where the government, in a similar situation to today, needs to generate revenue. They might not find it hard to justify taking money from rich people who are withdrawing massive amounts of tax-free money from their retirement accounts. Although an unlikely scenario, it forces you to look at the big picture and ask, “Why pay tax now if I can delay it?” Perhaps, 401(k) expert David Loeper said it best in a recent article: “With a highly uncertain future, basic option theory and common sense dictates that we should not pay additional tax now with certainty if we can avoid it, unless there is a clearly compelling advantage to doing so.” Don’t just go blindly and convert; do a thorough analysis and convince yourself that it really makes sense.
For most people, the analysis is too tedious and convoluted to spend time on, and most of the online tools are far too simplistic. If you have a financial advisor that you trust, he or she should do the analysis for you. If you are seriously considering conversion but don’t have a trusted financial advisor, it may be worth the cost to hire one just for this purpose. The fee may justify the wisdom of conversion, or it may save you from paying a lot of income tax today unnecessarily.
Friday, November 20, 2009
The Chips Fall Down
Today was the first real down day we’ve had in a couple of weeks. There was no specific reason for it, which is usually a good sign. After several big up days (the S&P 500 had jumped over +6% in just 11 trading days), it was time for a little selling (the pros call it “profit taking”). The financial press blamed it on a Bank of America analyst who downgraded 10 computer chip companies, including Intel, because of a potential “inventory overshoot” next year. But European markets were falling before this analyst opened his mouth, so investors were already in a selling mood prior to the opening bell in New York.
What about this feared “inventory overshoot?” Well, chip companies, along with just about everyone else, have pared their inventories to the bone during the recession. Now they’re finally starting to restock in anticipation of future demand. The concern is that they’ll overshoot, and have too much inventory by sometime next year. This would cause them to reduce production in order to work off the excess inventory. Could this happen? Of course; no one can predict demand precisely enough to always have the right amount of inventory. Will it matter? Probably not. Temporary mismatches between inventory and sales are common in business. Besides, the semiconductor industry is anticipated to grow 18% in 2010; I expect it could be more than this.
I bring up this rather arcane story because of something that happened to me recently, and which reminded me how low inventories have become. I ordered some additional memory for my Power Mac at home: 2 GB DIMMs, direct from the manufacturer (Micron Technology). That was several days ago, and the order hasn’t yet shipped. Why? The manufacturer is out of stock! We’re in the deepest recession since WWII and Micron can’t keep up with demand for its memory chips. So we already have at least one mismatch between sales and inventory: too little inventory. With demand increasing, manufacturers are going to have to ramp up big time to replenish their meager stocks. Also, I wouldn’t be surprised to see a lot of the more popular items sell out over the holidays. (You might want to finish your holiday gift shopping early this year.)
Most economic data and corporate earnings continue to exceed expectations. Earlier this week, Japan’s GDP report showed annualized growth of +4.8% in the 3rd quarter, more than twice what was forecast. And just a few minutes ago, the Bank of Japan upgraded its view of the country’s economic outlook, while leaving interest rates at historical lows. The global economy is clearly on the mend, but hardly anyone seems to notice, focusing as they do on lagging indicators like employment.
Except the stock market, that is. Global equities (as measured by the MSCI ACWI) are up over +70% since their March low. That’s a very impressive move in less than 9 months. Yet there are more than a few who think this huge up move is a head fake—a “countertrend” rally in a longer-term bear market. They think that we’re in the 1970’s all over again. Back then, stocks made little headway for the 16 years from 1966 to 1982. If they’re right, so the story goes, that could mean little upward progress until 2016. Not a pleasant thought.
But even if we’re “back to the ‘70s,” the stock market’s future could still be quite bright. Because what you don’t hear about those 16 years of stagflation is that the low point occurred in 1974, just under 9 years after the prior peak. Between December 1974 and the August 1982 “bottom,” which marked the beginning of an 18-year bull market, the S&P 500 had a total return of about +125%. Not bad for a bear market!
Coincidentally, the March 2009 low of this bear is exactly 9 years from the March 2000 peak. So even if 2009 is like 1974, there could still be a lot of appreciation before the next “official” bull market begins, as stocks have so far only risen about half as much from their lows as they did from 1974 to 1982. So even the worst-case scenario doesn’t sound so bad.
Also, if this is a “counter-trend” rally, it would be the longest and most powerful in history. The previous record is held by the initial rally after the crash of 1929, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average (there was no S&P 500 back then) rose +48% in 4 months before beginning its dizzying 3-year drop. The current rally is already significantly stronger and more than twice as long. The chances that the bear market of 2007–2009 is not yet over are, in my view, incredibly small. (And if this really is the first rally of a new bull market, as I believe, there’s a LOT more upside ahead.)
Too bad for the average investor, as mutual fund data indicate that a great many have been sitting out this rally, waiting (perhaps hoping is a better word) for a big decline that will allow them to get back in at much better prices. They are likely to have a very long wait. I said it in March and I’ll say it now: I don’t think we will ever again see the S&P 500 at 666 or the Dow at 6,500. Not just in our lifetimes. Ever. So stop waiting for the other shoe to drop. Yes, there are lots of problems, and yes, there will be more economic crises and bear markets in future years. But there will be no more falling footwear in 2010.
What about this feared “inventory overshoot?” Well, chip companies, along with just about everyone else, have pared their inventories to the bone during the recession. Now they’re finally starting to restock in anticipation of future demand. The concern is that they’ll overshoot, and have too much inventory by sometime next year. This would cause them to reduce production in order to work off the excess inventory. Could this happen? Of course; no one can predict demand precisely enough to always have the right amount of inventory. Will it matter? Probably not. Temporary mismatches between inventory and sales are common in business. Besides, the semiconductor industry is anticipated to grow 18% in 2010; I expect it could be more than this.
I bring up this rather arcane story because of something that happened to me recently, and which reminded me how low inventories have become. I ordered some additional memory for my Power Mac at home: 2 GB DIMMs, direct from the manufacturer (Micron Technology). That was several days ago, and the order hasn’t yet shipped. Why? The manufacturer is out of stock! We’re in the deepest recession since WWII and Micron can’t keep up with demand for its memory chips. So we already have at least one mismatch between sales and inventory: too little inventory. With demand increasing, manufacturers are going to have to ramp up big time to replenish their meager stocks. Also, I wouldn’t be surprised to see a lot of the more popular items sell out over the holidays. (You might want to finish your holiday gift shopping early this year.)
Most economic data and corporate earnings continue to exceed expectations. Earlier this week, Japan’s GDP report showed annualized growth of +4.8% in the 3rd quarter, more than twice what was forecast. And just a few minutes ago, the Bank of Japan upgraded its view of the country’s economic outlook, while leaving interest rates at historical lows. The global economy is clearly on the mend, but hardly anyone seems to notice, focusing as they do on lagging indicators like employment.
Except the stock market, that is. Global equities (as measured by the MSCI ACWI) are up over +70% since their March low. That’s a very impressive move in less than 9 months. Yet there are more than a few who think this huge up move is a head fake—a “countertrend” rally in a longer-term bear market. They think that we’re in the 1970’s all over again. Back then, stocks made little headway for the 16 years from 1966 to 1982. If they’re right, so the story goes, that could mean little upward progress until 2016. Not a pleasant thought.
But even if we’re “back to the ‘70s,” the stock market’s future could still be quite bright. Because what you don’t hear about those 16 years of stagflation is that the low point occurred in 1974, just under 9 years after the prior peak. Between December 1974 and the August 1982 “bottom,” which marked the beginning of an 18-year bull market, the S&P 500 had a total return of about +125%. Not bad for a bear market!
Coincidentally, the March 2009 low of this bear is exactly 9 years from the March 2000 peak. So even if 2009 is like 1974, there could still be a lot of appreciation before the next “official” bull market begins, as stocks have so far only risen about half as much from their lows as they did from 1974 to 1982. So even the worst-case scenario doesn’t sound so bad.
Also, if this is a “counter-trend” rally, it would be the longest and most powerful in history. The previous record is held by the initial rally after the crash of 1929, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average (there was no S&P 500 back then) rose +48% in 4 months before beginning its dizzying 3-year drop. The current rally is already significantly stronger and more than twice as long. The chances that the bear market of 2007–2009 is not yet over are, in my view, incredibly small. (And if this really is the first rally of a new bull market, as I believe, there’s a LOT more upside ahead.)
Too bad for the average investor, as mutual fund data indicate that a great many have been sitting out this rally, waiting (perhaps hoping is a better word) for a big decline that will allow them to get back in at much better prices. They are likely to have a very long wait. I said it in March and I’ll say it now: I don’t think we will ever again see the S&P 500 at 666 or the Dow at 6,500. Not just in our lifetimes. Ever. So stop waiting for the other shoe to drop. Yes, there are lots of problems, and yes, there will be more economic crises and bear markets in future years. But there will be no more falling footwear in 2010.
Monday, November 2, 2009
Day of the Dead?
I wasn’t planning to write 3 daily emails in a row, but after today’s stock market reversal, I thought it would be a good idea going into the weekend.
As you probably know, stocks took back yesterday’s gains and a bit more today. So in 3 days, we’ve had 3 big moves: down—up—down. So should Monday be up? Who knows; investors have all weekend to stew about it.
Yesterday, it seemed pretty clear that the rally was driven by the better-than-expected GDP report. So what drove today’s drop? Whatever it was, I don’t think it was news. The only significant report to come out today was consumer spending, which was down –0.5% for September after several months in a row of increases. But this was exactly the number that economists expected, and was largely the result of a decline in car purchases after the expiration of the “cash for clunkers” program (see yesterday’s email for a discussion of this). Outside of motor vehicles, most areas of consumer spending actually increased.
Today was the last trading day of the month, and the last day of the fiscal year for many mutual funds. So “portfolio window dressing” could have had an impact on today’s trading. Also, volatility has been increasing rapidly over the past few days, which often scares people out of stocks. Volatility tends to peak at inflection points in the market, particularly at bottoms. Currently, we’re at about the same level of volatility as we were at the market’s July low, which was the end of a –7% correction; as of today, the S&P 500 is down about –6% from it’s October peak.
It thus seems that we’re in the process of forming a base from which another significant rally can start. Whether it begins as soon as next week or later is impossible to guess, but I doubt it will take more than a few weeks for the market—and investor sentiment—to turn around again. Interestingly, investor sentiment is also at about the same level as it was at the July bottom, yet the S&P 500 is nearly +18% higher than it was then. The wall of worry that typically drives bull markets remains solid.
Yes, this has been a disappointing week, and scary, too, owing to big daily price swings. But the S&P 500 is down barely –2% for the month, which is only 1/10th of its drop of last October. And this came after 7 consecutive months of gains. A pause in the upward momentum shouldn’t be a surprise. I think this pause will be one that refreshes, similar to the one in July. You may not remember, but back then the stock market made no headway at all for 2 full months, and was actually –5.4% lower in early July than it had been in early May. But those who stayed put and didn’t panic have already been rewarded with a double-digit gain.
As you probably know, stocks took back yesterday’s gains and a bit more today. So in 3 days, we’ve had 3 big moves: down—up—down. So should Monday be up? Who knows; investors have all weekend to stew about it.
Yesterday, it seemed pretty clear that the rally was driven by the better-than-expected GDP report. So what drove today’s drop? Whatever it was, I don’t think it was news. The only significant report to come out today was consumer spending, which was down –0.5% for September after several months in a row of increases. But this was exactly the number that economists expected, and was largely the result of a decline in car purchases after the expiration of the “cash for clunkers” program (see yesterday’s email for a discussion of this). Outside of motor vehicles, most areas of consumer spending actually increased.
Today was the last trading day of the month, and the last day of the fiscal year for many mutual funds. So “portfolio window dressing” could have had an impact on today’s trading. Also, volatility has been increasing rapidly over the past few days, which often scares people out of stocks. Volatility tends to peak at inflection points in the market, particularly at bottoms. Currently, we’re at about the same level of volatility as we were at the market’s July low, which was the end of a –7% correction; as of today, the S&P 500 is down about –6% from it’s October peak.
It thus seems that we’re in the process of forming a base from which another significant rally can start. Whether it begins as soon as next week or later is impossible to guess, but I doubt it will take more than a few weeks for the market—and investor sentiment—to turn around again. Interestingly, investor sentiment is also at about the same level as it was at the July bottom, yet the S&P 500 is nearly +18% higher than it was then. The wall of worry that typically drives bull markets remains solid.
Yes, this has been a disappointing week, and scary, too, owing to big daily price swings. But the S&P 500 is down barely –2% for the month, which is only 1/10th of its drop of last October. And this came after 7 consecutive months of gains. A pause in the upward momentum shouldn’t be a surprise. I think this pause will be one that refreshes, similar to the one in July. You may not remember, but back then the stock market made no headway at all for 2 full months, and was actually –5.4% lower in early July than it had been in early May. But those who stayed put and didn’t panic have already been rewarded with a double-digit gain.
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